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s the euro crisis continues and 
unemployment climbs to  new heights, 
the clamour calling for Europe  to  ‘do 
something’ is getting louder. But the real question 
is: can Europe, or rather the EU, do ‘something’ 
that  would actually have a real  impact on 
unemployment? In other words, does a European 
plan or employment strategy make sense?  
The honest answer is that the EU as such can do 
very little to affect employment in the short run. 
And over the long run, there is scant  evidence 
that the EU’s Lisbon strategy had a significant 
impact on employment.1 
The  present  ‘reorientation’  of  priorities 
constitutes a recurring pattern in European 
politics: at first austerity is proclaimed as the pre-
condition for growth,  but when recession bites, 
growth and employment become the pre-
condition for continued austerity. Europe  has 
already  been  through this cycle,  about 15 years 
ago. In the early 1990s, when plans for EMU were 
drawn up, Germany pushed through the 
‘Stability Pact’ as a price for giving up the 
Deutsche Mark.  As  Europe  sank  into deep 
recession after 1995, attention shifted to growth 
and the ‘Stability Pact’ became the ‘Stability and 
Growth Pact’ (SGP) when the European Council 
adopted a Resolution on Employment and 
Growth in 1997. However, this Resolution, which 
contained the already familiar list of ingredients 
                                                       
1 Gros, D. (2006), “Employment and Competitiveness: The 
Key  Role  of  Education”,  CEPS  Policy  Brief  No.  93, 
February (http://www.ceps.eu/book/employment-and-
competitiveness-key-role-education). 
(labour market reforms, education, etc.) remained 
‘aspirational’  –  although the unemployment 
problem then was as acute as it is today. 
If Europe is to avoid falling into the same trap 
again,  a few hard facts need to be faced. 
Moreover, Europe’s policy-makers need to realise 
that this recession is different so not all of the old 
recipes will work this time. 
It is always best to start with the facts:  
1)  Southern Europe has a structural 
unemployment problem 
First of all,  it  should be recognised  that the 
unemployment problems of the euro area’s South 
are endemic. Figure 1 shows the unemployment 
rates of the euro area ‘North’ (Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) and the euro area ‘South’  (Spain, 
Italy, Greece, Portugal, Malta and Cyprus). It is 
apparent that southern unemployment rates were 
almost always much higher than those of the 
north.  This  salient  fact tends to be overlooked 
today,  but  in  the  1990s  it  played  a  key  role 
because it was taken as proof that price stability 
and fiscal rectitude also  delivered  higher 
employment.  
However,  this  key  insight  was  forgotten as the 
long credit boom allowed the South to reduce 
unemployment on the back of huge capital 
inflows. When these flows stopped (economists 
call this a ‘sudden stop’,  which was only 
supposed to happen in emerging markets), 
unemployment shot up. Figure 1 also shows that 
A EUROPE’S RECURRENT EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS | 2 
 
15 years ago the unemployment problem was as 
urgent as it is today. In Spain the unemployment 
rate was above 21% in 1994 – almost as high as it 
is today, and in Italy it was higher in 1996 than it 
is today.  
The main difference between the 1990s’ cycle and 
that of today is that during those years the South 
and the North experienced broadly the same 
cycle, albeit with differing amplitudes. Today the 
divergence is much more extreme: 
unemployment rates in the North and South are 
actually moving in opposite directions. This has 
concrete implications: for  Germany and its 
neighbours, there is simply no ‘employment 
emergency’ and hence zero political appetite for 
special efforts to stimulate the economy or 
undertake labour market reforms. On the 
contrary, in Germany minimum wages are now 
being extended to more and more sectors. This is 
of course the opposite of  what Germany is 
preaching to other countries. But in reality it 
should be regarded as a small but useful 
contribution to the much-needed rebalancing 
exercise within the euro area. 
Figure 1. Unemployment rates 
 
Note: EZ North includes Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Belgium 
and Luxembourg; EZ South includes Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Malta and 
Cyprus. 
Source: Eurostat. 
2)  Youth unemployment is ingrained 
The second hard fact: youth unemployment has 
now reached 50% in Spain and is soon likely to 
reach  a  similar  level  in  Greece.  This  is  always 
described as ‘unacceptable’. However, the sorry 
reality is that it was already that ‘unacceptably’ 
high in Spain in the mid-1990s.  Moreover,  the 
relationship between  youth unemployment and 
general unemployment has generally not differed 
in this recession from  previous ones.  Figure  2 
shows the ratio of youth unemployment 
(population  aged  15-24)  relative  to that of total 
unemployment (ages 15-64yrs). It is apparent that 
in most countries this ratio has been constant, 
indicating that the current extreme levels of youth 
unemployment in southern Europe are neither 
unprecedented, nor should they be considered 
surprising given the deep recession. In southern 
Europe the youth unemployment rate has always 
been between two and three times as high as the 
overall unemployment rate. 
Moreover, one should keep in mind that the 50% 
youth unemployment rate refers to the 
percentage of young people looking for work, but 
unable to find it. In southern Europe there are 
actually relatively  few (even before the crisis) 
young people looking for work, given that youth 
labour force participation rates are low. The 50% 
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unemployment rate in Italy refers only to the less 
than  30% of all youth (aged 15-24)  who  are 
actually looking for a job. This explains why there 
are more unemployed young people in the UK (1 
million) than in Spain (900,000) or Italy (600,000), 
even though  the youth unemployment rate in 
these two latter countries is so high. The reason is 
that despite these extreme youth unemployment 
rates,  still ‘only’ 20% of all unemployed people 
are young (compared to 40% in the UK). 
Figure 2. Youth unemployment relative to total unemployment, selected countries 
 
Source: European Commission Services. 
3)  What can be done?  
The  official  mantra  is  of  course  more  labour 
market reforms. No self-respecting economist 
would ever object to them. But can they have a 
significant impact in this crisis? 
The ‘GIPS’ (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) 
face a fundamental problem of re-allocating 
labour from construction (Spain and Ireland) or 
domestic consumption (Greece and Portugal) to 
tradable goods (manufacturing and tourism). In 
Spain, for example, there are over  one  million 
unemployed construction workers  alone. No 
amount of labour market flexibility will transform 
them into skilled manufacturing workers who 
can compete, even on very low wages, with their 
German or Chinese competitors.  A substantial 
increase in long-term unemployment is thus 
unavoidable. This is not to say that none of the 
unemployed today can be used in other sectors of 
the economy, especially those producing goods 
and services for export. But the required massive 
re-allocation of labour will take time and will 
require lower wages to price the new workers 
into the market.  
How much time? The problem for the GIPS is the 
scale of the shift in labour that is required. Given 
the  size of their current account deficits at the 
peak of the boom, in both cases it should be much 
more than 10% of the workforce. Realistically, 
even with a very flexible labour market, it will 
take the better part of a decade for this to happen. 
In Germany it took almost ten years (from 1995 to 
2005) to digest the aftermath of the re-unification 
boom. Politicians should acknowledge this 
timeframe instead of always  promising a 
recovery just a few quarters away. Lower wages 
are part of the process. But with a normally 
functioning labour market some  reduction in 
wages should not require any special government 
action when unemployment is in double digits.2  
                                                       
2 For an in-depth discussion of the link between wages 
and competitiveness, see Daniel  Gros (2012), 
“Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area: Symptom 
or cause of the crisis?”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 266, April. 
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Lower wages will evidently  have a pro-cyclical 
effect in the short run as they reduce demand. 
This  is  unfortunate,  but  unavoidable.  The 
argument that lower wages would reduce 
demand, and might thus be counterproductive to 
employment, was also very popular in Germany 
during the early  part  of  the  last  decade.  The 
government mostly ignored it; but more 
importantly wages were set according to labour 
market forces,  as  demonstrated  by a stable 
relationship between unemployment and wages 
(also called the ‘Philips curve’ by economists), as 
shown  in  Figure  3.  Today,  all  agree that 
ultimately  the payoff from ‘wage moderation’ 
(market-led, not politically enforced) was very 
high. 
Figure 3. Phillips curves: Germany vs. Spain 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Commission Services data (Ameco). 
The key issue now for the GIPS is how well their 
labour markets will work. Unfortunately, the 
record on this account is rather discouraging for 
the country with the biggest problem (Spain), if 
one  considers  the relationship between 
unemployment and wage growth (the Phillips 
curve) for Spain, shown in Figure 3. It is apparent 
that the curve has deteriorated since 2007, when 
the rate of wage inflation was much higher in 
2008 for the same level of unemployment as in 
the  early  2000s.  This  is  probably  due  to  the 
backwards wage indexation that  transmits the 
terms of trade shocks from higher oil prices to the 
labour  market.  Consequently  an unemployment 
rate of at least  20% is needed to keep wage 
inflation close to zero.  
The key reason why unemployment has such a 
low influence on wages in Spain must be the 
extreme ‘insider-outsider’ structure of this 
market.  The  brunt of the reduction in 
employment that has occurred since the start of 
the crisis is accounted for by job losses in 
temporary  or other ‘atypical’ employment. 
Further research will be conducted to test the 
insider-outsider model. 
The  good  news, however,  is that the German 
Philips curve seems to be working: wages  are 
increasing  as unemployment falls.  What is still 
untested is the flexibility of labour markets in the 
south of Europe. Very recent data from some 
countries is encouraging, with unit labour costs 
falling rapidly (relative to Germany) in some 
countries (Greece and Spain, for example).  
For almost a decade in Germany the 
overvaluation with which it entered the euro was 
offset by a differential of about 2-3% per annum 
in wage costs as German costs were flat, but were 
increasing by about 3% in southern Europe. On 
current trends it would take less than a decade for 
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t h e  G I P S  t o  c l o s e  t h e  g a p  w i t h  G e r m a n y .  T h e  
adjustment  has  thus  clearly  started.  The  real 
difficulty  is, in contrast to Germany in the late 
1990s,that  the GIPS are  starting  with a debt 
overhang, and so financial markets are unlikely to 
provide financing for the lengthy adjustment 
period that is still ahead. 
4)  Learning the hard way? 
The  new  member  countries  of  the Baltic region 
(and Bulgaria) had even more extreme 
consumption and/or construction booms and 
should be facing the same problem as the GIPS. 
In fact,  their problems should be even greater, 
since  these countries had even larger  external 
imbalances and are in a ‘quasi monetary union’ 
with their currency boards (fixed exchange rate), 
but without access to cheap financing from the 
ECB for their banks. But, perhaps because of this 
lack of support from the ECB, the adjustment was 
swifter.  As  shown  in  Figure  4,  their current 
accounts turned to surplus within two years. As a 
result of the rapid adjustment, their 
unemployment rates also rose, but peaked early 
(in 2010) to levels close to, but still below, those of 
Spain today.  The  recovery  since  then  has  been 
slow, but at least the worst is over as 
unemployment rates  are now gradually  coming 
down - in contrast to those of southern Europe, 
where they are still on the rise.  
Figure 4. Current account and unemployment rates in the Baltic region 
 
Note: Current account as % GDP. 
Source: Eurostat. 
5)  Let Europe spend more?3 
The only policy instrument that promises a quick 
payoff in terms of higher employment is that of 
more spending. But,  given that the EU budget 
amounts to less than 1% of GDP and is 
constrained by a multi-annual framework that 
ends in 2013, and which leaves very little room 
for  amendment,  it is clear that the EU as such 
could not create a significant number of jobs by 
                                                       
3 This section is based on Daniel Gros (2012), “Europe’s 
Misguided Search for Growth” (http://www.ceps.eu/ 
book/europe%E2%80%99s-misguided-search-growth). 
spending more. (Moreover, a majority of member 
states would rather cut the EU budget still 
further).4 
However, as in previous recessions, two potential 
EU  instruments are often mentioned: the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the EU’s 
Structural Funds for infrastructure investment. 
                                                       
4 On the myth of an ever-expanding EU budget, see Jorge 
Núñez Ferrer (2012), “Between a rock and the 
Multiannual Financial Framework”, CEPS Commentary 
(http://www.ceps.eu/book/between-rock-and-
multiannual-financial-framework). 
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The  EIB:  more funding for the EIB to  lend to 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is one standard 
element of EU employment plans,  under the 
argument that SMEs create most employment. 
But the business model of the EIB would have to 
change radically to make it a useful instrument 
under current circumstances because the EIB 
always requires government guarantees. But the 
fiscally stressed sovereigns in southern Europe 
cannot afford further obligations.  Moreover, 
contrary to popular misconception, the EIB 
cannot lend directly to SMEs. The EIB can only 
provide large banks with funding to lend to local 
SMEs. But this is essentially already being done 
by the ECB in  its three-year loan operation 
(LTRO).  Both  the  ECB and the  EIB would be 
‘super-senior’ and could thus be counter-
productive by crowding out private lending. 
At its meeting in June 2012, the European Council 
will examine the ‘project bonds’ proposed by the 
Commission. The idea is “provide EU support to 
project companies issuing bonds to finance large-
scale infrastructure projects”, where support 
means sharing, together with the EIB, part of the 
risk by improving the rating of the debt issued by 
the project entities.  
These project bonds, to be issued in a very small 
amount, would not constitute ‘eurobonds’ as 
commonly understood (i.e. bonds with a joint and 
several guarantee of euro area member countries 
with which member states could finance their 
normal running expenditure).   These  project 
bonds should be understood as special ‘covered 
bonds’, to be used to finance cross-border 
infrastructure projects that yield their own cash 
flow to service these bonds.   They  would thus 
represent a useful, but rather minor, addition to 
the  EU’s  arsenal of financial instruments (as 
opposed to aiming specifically at the financing 
difficulties of the peripheral euro area member 
states). 
 Structural  Funds  or jobs through infrastructure 
investment (a ‘Marshall Plan’ for Europe’s South): 
this is another standard recipe that might not be 
appropriate this time. Fifteen years ago there was 
a clear need for better infrastructure in the South. 
But in the meantime, the region has seen a decade 
of rather high infrastructure investment with 
Spain, Greece and Portugal spending over 3% of 
their GDP on such development. Most countries 
in the South should have adequate infrastructure 
stock  by now5.  By contrast, more infrastructure 
investment would actually make most  sense in 
Germany, where spending on infrastructure has 
been anaemic (only 1.6% of GDP, half the rate of 
Spain) for almost a decade. This is why German 
autobahns are notoriously congested.  
Table 1. Investment in infrastructure (% of GDP) 
Country 
Average 
2000-2007  2010  2011 
European Union 
(15 countries)   2.3  2.5  2.3 
Germany   1.5  1.6  1.7 
Greece   3.3  2.8  2.6 
Spain   3.6  3.8  2.7 
Source: European Commission, Statistical Annex to Spring 
2012 Forecast. 
But one does not need European funding to 
finance infrastructure in Germany when  the 
government can raise funds at negative real cost. 
At the rates it is paying today,  the German 
government should be able to find many 
investment projects that make a positive social 
rate of return. Given that Germany is close to full 
employment, more infrastructure-spending there 
would probably suck in imports (and attract 
unemployed construction workers from Spain). 
This  would  contribute  to  the  much-needed 
rebalancing of the euro area. 
But,  unfortunately,  this is unlikely to happen,6 
because this kind of spending runs up  against 
popular opposition  and in  any  event is  not 
decided by the federal government but rather at 
local and regional level,  where grassroots 
opposition against any large project is the 
strongest (it took over 20 years to push through 
the modernisation of the railway station in a mid-
sized town like Stuttgart). 
                                                       
5  In countries like Italy, for example, the amount of 
expenditure is not reflected in the quality of 
infrastructure. Considering that an important share of 
any eventual additional spending would be inefficient, a 
further increase in this budget is not recommended.  
6  This  shows  Germany’s  ability  to  follow  its  own 
priorities, which  is of course another manifestation of the 
asymmetry in adjustment pressure pointed out by Paul 
de Grauwe (2012), “In Search of Symmetry in the 
Eurozone”, CEPS Policy Brief No.  268 
(http://www.ceps.eu/book/search-symmetry-
eurozone).  7 | DANIEL GROS 
 
6)  What should be done?  
The  urge  to  be  seen  to  be  ‘doing  something’ is 
leading Europe’s policy-makers to cast around for 
the few instruments with which the EU can claim 
to foster growth. However, a closer examination 
of the facts suggests that this time is indeed 
different.  The  North  and the South of the euro 
area are diverging so much that they need very 
different policy prescriptions (the East is already 
recovering slowly after a very tough adjustment 
process). 
Moreover, the two instruments the EU has to 
address structural problems in the South (the EIB 
and the Structural Funds) are unlikely to be 
effective this time. 
Accepting the reality that very little can be done 
at EU level to create jobs does not mean that 
nothing can be done. Deep service-sector reforms 
in Germany would also be helpful to unlock the 
country’s productivity potential and open its 
market for the export of services from southern 
Europe. Table 2 shows that the regulation of the 
important sectors of professional services is even 
tighter in Germany than in France or Spain. 
Opening the German market yields a ‘double 
dividend’:  not only does Germany benefit, but 
this way the South would have the chance to find 
jobs for its rather well-educated youth,  which 
right now face  only  a  choice between 
unemployment and emigration. 
Table 2. Index of intensity of regulation affecting 
professional services  
   Accounting  Architect  Engineer  Legal  Overall 
Germany  2.43  3.05  2.31  3.62  2.9 
France  2.85  2.76  na  2.82  2.8* 
Italy  3.63  3.11  2.92  3.29  3.2 
Spain  1.93  2.14  1.60  2.57  2.1 
Source: OECD. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
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